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William A. Waddell, Jr.***
PREFACE
Fraud litigation in Arkansas has expanded beyond the reach of the current
Arkansas Model Jury Instructions. The one approved jury instruction for the
tort of deceit, AMI 405,' does not describe the elements of constructive fraud2
or fraudulent concealment These claims are alleged as frequently as the
traditional claim of deceit. In addition, key terms such as "representation" and
"justifiable reliance" are not defined for the jury.
Furthermore, Arkansas case law recognizes the distinction between claims
for breach of contract and fraud. Without additional model instructions, the
present AMI 405 is inadequate to allow a jury to understand the distinction.
Therefore, the drafters believe these proposed model instructions will
improve the trial practice of fraud cases in Arkansas. Every effort has been
made to make the instructions complete, impartial, and in conformity with
Arkansas law. However, the drafters make no warranty as to the instructions.
The instructions are submitted solely for consideration and comment as a
service to members of the bench and bar with the expectation that a final
revised draft may be proposed for study and adoption by the Arkansas Supreme
Court. Comments concerning the instructions may be submitted to William A.
Waddell, Jr., Friday, Eldredge & Clark, 2000 First Commercial Building, 400
West Capitol Avenue, Little Rock, Arkansas 72201.
* Senior Clerk, Honorable Elsijane T. Roy, United States Judge for the Eastern District
of Arkansas.
** Partner, Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, Little Rock, Arkansas.
*** Partner, Friday, Eldredge & Clark, Little Rock, Arkansas.
1. In ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, No. 405 (3d ed. & Supp. 1995).
The jury is instructed that the following five elements are essential for a claim of deceit: (1)
damage to claimant, (2) false representation of a material fact, (3) defendant's knowledge of
falsity or lack of basis, (4) defendant's intent to induce reliance on the false representation, and
(5) claimant's justifiable reliance to his detriment.
2. See South County, Inc. v. First W. Loan Co., 315 Ark. 722, 871 S.W.2d 325 (1994);
Morrison v. Back Yard Burgers, Inc., 91 F.3d 1184, 1188 (8th Cir. 1996).
3. See Ward v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 284 Ark. 355, 681 S.W.2d 365 (1984);
Copelin v. Corter, 291 Ark. 218, 724 S.W.2d 146 (1987).
4. See, e.g., Evans Indus. Coatings, Inc. v. Chancery Court of Union County, 315 Ark.
728, 870 S.W.2d 701 (1994); Fidelity Mortgage Co.v. Cook, 307 Ark. 496, 821 S.W.2d 39
(1991) (Newbern, J., dissenting).
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CHAPTER 1: FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION (DECEIT)
FORM A-1
ELEMENTS OF CLAIM
claims(s) (plaintiffs) damages from - (defen-
dant(s)) for deceit and [has] [have] the burden of proving each of five
essential propositions:
First, that [he] [she] [they] [has] [have] sustained damages;
Second, that a false representation of fact was made by
(defendant(s));
Third, that - (defendant(s)) knew or believed that the
representation was false, [or did not have a sufficient basis of information to
make it];
Fourth, that _ (defendant(s)) intended to induce
(plaintiff(s)) [to act] [or] [to refrain from action] in reliance upon the
misrepresentation; and
Fifth, (plaintiff(s)) justifiably relied upon the representation
and, as a result, sustained damages.
[If you find from the evidence in this case that each of these propositions
has been proved, then your verdict should be for _ (plaintiff(s)) (against
the party or parties who made the false representations); but if, on the other
hand, you find from the evidence that any of these propositions has not been
proved, then your verdict should be for - (defendant(s)).]
COMMENT
This instruction is identical to AMI 405.5 However, the drafters believe
the instruction should be changed to omit the bracketed portion of the third
element which states "or did not have a sufficient basis of information to make
it" for two reasons. First, this phrase does not appear consistently in the
elements of fraudulent misrepresentation as set forth in Arkansas case law.'
Second, the bracketed phrase is more appropriate in the proposed model
instruction A-3 which sets forth those situations in which "knowledge of
falsity" is established. Until the Arkansas Supreme Court expresses an opinion
on this issue, however, practitioners should continue to use AMI 405 as
promulgated.
5. See supra, note 1.
6. CompareCalandro v. Parkerson, 327 Ark. 131, 137,936 S.W.2d 755,759 (1997) with
Wheeler Motor Co. v. Roth, 315 Ark. 318, 324, 867 S.W.2d 446, 449 (1993), modified,
Woodline Motor Freight, Inc. v. Troutman Oil Co., 327 Ark. 448, 938 S.W.2d 565 (1997)
(modifying measurement of prejudgment interest).
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CHAPTER 1: FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION (DECEIT)
FORM A-2
"REPRESENTATION" - DEFINED
A representation sufficient to form the basis of an action for
fraudulent misrepresentation must be a material, false statement of fact
which is made before or at the time the plaintiff acts on the representation.
COMMENT
This instruction states the rule in South County, Inc. v. First Western Loan
Co.;7 P.A.M Transportation v. Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield;8 Baskin v.
Collins;9 and Vanderboom v. Sexton. "0 With the exception of the bracketed
portions that follow, the drafters believe that this instruction is appropriate in
every case when a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation is made. The
following bracketed instructions should only be used when appropriate.
(Representation as to Future Event]
[The representation must relate to a past event, or a present circumstance,
but not to a future event.]
COMMENT
This subparagraph is appropriate when there is an issue as to whether the
representation relates to a present circumstance or to a future event. The
instruction is derived from Morrison v. Back Yard Burgers, Inc. " and Delta
School of Commerce, Inc. v. Wood.'2 A representation limited to a future event
may be a promise which forms the basis of an action for breach of contract, or
a mere prediction which does not give rise to such a claim, but the representa-
tion is not a fraudulent one.
7. 315 Ark. 722, 871 S.W.2d 325 (1994).
8. 315 Ark. 234, 868 S.W.2d 33 (1993).
9. 305 Ark. 137, 806 S.W.2d 3 (1991).
10. 460 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1972).
II. 91 F.3d 1184, 1186.
12. 298 Ark. 195, 200, 766 S.W.2d 424, 427 (1989).
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[Representation Misleading Because Incomplete]
[A representation stating the truth so far as it goes but which the maker
knows or believes to be materially misleading because of his failure to state
additional or qualifying facts is a false representation of fact.]
COMMENT
This subparagraph should be used when the plaintiff alleges that the
representation is fraudulent because it is incomplete. The instruction follows
the Restatement rule.'3 The drafters note also that partial disclosure with
knowledge that the partial disclosure is misleading may create a duty to
disclose the omitted facts. 4
[Misrepresentation of Intention]
[A representation of the maker's intention to do or not to do a particular
thing is a false representation of fact if he knows he does not have that
intention when the representation is made.]
COMMENT
This subparagraph should be used when there is an issue as to whether the
defendant misrepresented his intention. The instruction states the Restatement
rule regarding promissory fraud 5 and is consistent with Undem v. First
National Bank, 6 Anthony v. First National Bank of Magnolia, 17 and the dissent
in Fidelity Mortgage Co. of Texas v. Cook.'" Two restrictions on the
application of the doctrine of promissory fraud are incorporated in this
instruction. First, the intention not to perform must be contemporaneous with
the making of the promise."' Second, evidence of a misrepresentation
recklessly made is not sufficient to support an inference of intent.20
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 529 (1977).
14. See Ragland v. Shattuck Nat'l Bank, 36 F.3d 983 (10th Cir. 1994); Roddenberry v.
Roddenberry, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 907 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 (1965).
16. 46 Ark. App. 158, 165, 879 S.W.2d 451, 454 (1994).
17. 244 Ark. 1015, 1028,431 S.W.2d 267, 275 (1968).
18. 307 Ark. 496, 821 S.W.2d 39 (Newbem, J., dissenting). See also Sudul v. Computer
Outsourcing Servs., 868 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); McIntyre v. McLeod, 678 So. 2d 1105
(Ala. Civ. App. 1995).
19. See Exeter Bancorporation, Inc. v. Kemper Sec. Group, Inc., 58 F.3d 1306 (8th Cir.
1995).
20. See National Sec. Ins. Co. v. Donaldson, 664 So. 2d 871, 876-77, (Ala. 1995).
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The instruction does not apply when the maker misrepresents a third
party's intention. The drafters believe the misrepresentation of a third party's
intent should be treated as any other claim for the misrepresentation of a
material fact.21
[Statement of Opinion or Belief]
[An erroneous expression of opinion or belief, if honestly made, is not a
false representation of fact.]
COMMENT
This subparagraph should be used when there is an issue as to whether an
alleged representation is a statement of opinion or belief or is a fraudulent
misrepresentation. The instruction states the rule in Anthony v. First National
Bank of Magnolia22 and Delta School of Commerce, Inc. v. Wood.23
[Misrepresentation of Law]
COMMENT
The drafters propose no model instruction regarding misrepresentations
of law. Although the Restatement defines the elements of an actionable tort for
misrepresentation of law24 and other states have model instructions for the
tort,' the drafters found no Arkansas authority approving an action for deceit
for the misrepresentation of domestic law.26
21. See Delta Sch. of Commerce, Inc. v. Wood, 298 Ark. 195, 766 S.W.2d 424 (1989).
22. 244 Ark. 1015, 1028, 431 S.W.2d 267, 274 (1968).
23. 298 Ark. 195, 766 S.W.2d 424.
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545 (1977).
25. See, e.g., OKLAHOMA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, No. 18.9 (2d ed.).
26. See Glasgow v. Greenfield, 9 Ark. App. 224, 230, 657 S.W.2d 578, 581 (1983) (citing
Adkins v. Hoskins, 176 Ark. 565, 3 S.W.2d 322 (1928) (recognizing the general rule that fraud
cannot be predicated upon a misrepresentation of law); McDonald v. Smith, 95 Ark. 523, 527
(1910) (holding that where the attorney-defendant only expressed an opinion of the law, there
was no fraudulent misrepresentation).
1997]
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CHAPTER 1: FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION (DECEIT)
FORM A-3
KNOWLEDGE OF FALSITY
A person knows or believes that a representation is false if the
evidence demonstrates that (1) the person actually knew that the represen-
tation was false when made or (2) the person lacked a sufficient basis for
making the representation and knew he did not have a sufficient basis for
making the representation.
[Ambiguous Representation]
[If a person makes a representation which he knows to be capable of two
interpretations, one of which he knows to be false and the other true, the
representation may constitute a false representation of fact if the representation
was made with the intention that it be understood in the sense in which it is
false.]
COMMENT
This instruction states the general rule concerning knowledge of the falsity
of a representation. Subpart (1) is based upon Clark v. Ridgeway.27 Subpart
(2) is derived from Morrison v. Back Yard Burgers, Inc. 28 The situation in
subpart (2) is distinguishable from the situation where the defendant did not
know he had an insufficient basis to make the statement and negligently made
the statement. The latter situation is not fraud. 29 With the exception of the
bracketed portions of the instruction, the drafters believe that the instruction is
appropriate in every case in which there is a claim of fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion.
The bracketed portion of the instruction-ambiguous representa-
tion--should be used only when there is an issue as to whether the representa-
tion at issue was intentionally ambiguous. This portion of the instruction is
derived from the Restatementa" and amplifies the third element of fraudulent
misrepresentation stated in AMI 405.31
27. 323 Ark. 378, 914 S.W.2d 745 (1996).
28. 91 F.3d 1184, 1186.
29. See South County, Inc. v. First W. Loan Co., 315 Ark. 722, 871 S.W.2d 325 (1994).
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 527(1977). The drafters elected not to
include the remainder of § 527 because they believed those sections were inconsistent with the
concept of intentional fraud.




CHAPTER 1: FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION (DECEIT)
FORM A-4
REPRESENTATION TO AGENT OR THIRD PARTY
You are instructed that the maker of a fraudulent representation to
the agent of the plaintiff or to a third party may be liable for damages to
the plaintiff who justifiably relies upon the representation if: (1) the
representation is made to the agent or third party; and (2) the maker
either intends or has reason to expect that the representation will be
repeated to the plaintiff; and (3) that it will influence his conduct in the
transaction.
COMMENT
This instruction follows the Restatement rule. 2 This instruction is
appropriate when the defendant made the representation to an agent of the
plaintiff or to a third party.
CHAPTER 1: FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION (DECEIT)
FORM A-5
"MATERIAL" - DEFINED
A fact or statement of fact is material if it was a substantial factor
which influenced the plaintiffs decision. It is not necessary, however, that
the fact or statement of fact be the paramount or decisive factor, only that
it be a fact to which a person might reasonably and justifiably be expected
to attach importance in making his decision.
COMMENT
This instruction is derived from Ellis v. Liter.33 The drafters believe this
instruction is appropriate for use in every case in which there is an allegation
of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment.
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 533 (1977).
33. 311 Ark. 35, 38, 841 S.W.2d 155, 157 (1992) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL.,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 108 (5th ed. 1984)).
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CHAPTER 1: FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION (DECEIT)
FORM A-6
"JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE" - DEFINED
Reliance is justifiable if the plaintiff actually relied upon a misrepre-
sentation by the defendant and that the plaintiffs reliance was reasonable.
Actual reliance means that the plaintiff either acted or did not act by
reason of the defendant's misrepresentation.
COMMENT
This instruction states the rule in McAnally v. Gildersleeve,34 and MFA
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Keller.35 The drafters believe this instruction is
appropriate whenever justifiable reliance is an element of fraud, including a
claim of constructive fraud.36
CHAPTER 1: FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION (DECEIT)
FoRM A-7
KNOWLEDGE OF THE MISREPRESENTED FACT
If a party knows the falsity of facts being represented, that party has
no right to act upon that misrepresentation and, therefore, any reliance
upon such a misrepresentation is not justifiable.
COMMENT
This instruction is derived from Mid-America Truck & Equipment, Inc. v.
Mack Trucks, Inc.37 This instruction may be appropriate when there are facts
presented which suggest that the plaintiff had knowledge of the falsity of the
misrepresented fact.
34. 16 F.3d 1493 (8th Cir. 1994).
35. 274 Ark. 281,623 S.W.2d 841 (1981).
36. See infra Chapter 3, Form C-I.
37. 519 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. Ark. 1981).
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CHAPTER 1: FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION (DECEIT)
FORM A-8
COMPARATIVE FAULT
If you should find that the plaintiffs damage was proximately caused
by fault on the part of the defendant and not by fault on the part of the
plaintiff, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover the full amount of any
damages you may find he sustained as a result of the occurrence.
If you should find that the occurrence was proximately caused by
fault of both the plaintiff and the defendant, then you must compare the
percentages of their fault.
If the fault of the plaintiff is of less degree than the fault of the
defendant, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover any damages which you
may find he has sustained as a result of the occurrence after you have
reduced them in proportion to the degree of his own fault.
On the other hand, if the defendant was not at fault or if the fault of
the plaintiff is equal to or greater in degree than the fault of the defendant,
then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover any damages.
COMMENT
This instruction follows the model of AMI 2102-211531 on comparative
fault. Although some Arkansas trial courts have indicated that the Arkansas
comparative fault statute39 applies to fraud claims, the drafters are not aware of
any appellate decision which directly addresses this issue.' The typical
fraudulent misrepresentation case is essentially an "all or nothing" proposition
for a plaintiff. Use of comparative fault may permit a jury to reach some
middle ground between the positions of the parties. For variations of this
instruction which may be necessary depending upon the nature and number of
other claims, see AMI 2102-2115. 4'
38. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, Nos. 2102-2115 (3d ed. & Supp.
1995).
39. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1995).
40. Compare WOODS & DEERE, COMPARATIVE FAULT, § 14:51 (3d ed. 1996), Quinney
v. Pittman, 320 Ark. 177, 188, 895 S.W.2d 538, 544 (1995), and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 774 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1985).
41. Supra, note 38.
1997l
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CHAPTER 1: FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION (DECEIT)
FORM A-9
CAUSATION
To prove the element of causation, the plaintiff must prove that he
sustained damage as a result of his justifiable reliance on the defendant's
misrepresentation.
COMMENT
This instruction is based upon MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keller.4 The drafters
believe this instruction is appropriate in each case in which a claim of
fraudulent misrepresentation is made.
CHAPTER 1: FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION (DECEIT)
FoRM A-10
MEASURE OF DAMAGES
If you find for the plaintiff on the question of liability, you must then
fix the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate him
[for the following element of damage][for any of the following elements of
damage] caused by the [fraudulent misrepresentation] [fraudulent concealment]
[constructive fraud] of the defendant:
[Here insert the element or elements]
Whether [this element] [any of these elements] of damage [has] [have]
been proved by the evidence is for you to determine.
COMMENT
This instruction follows the format of AMI 222 L'
42. 274 Ark. 281,623 Sw. 2d 841 (1981).
43. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, Nos. 2221 (3d ed.) For a discussion
of the elements of damage available in fraud cases, see HOWARD W. BRILL, ARKANSAS LAW OF
DAMAGES § 33-7 (3d ed. 1996). For a discussion of the "benefit of the bargain" and "out-of-
pocket" measures of damages applied in fraud cases, see Interstate Freeway Servs., Inc. v.
Houser, 310 Ark. 302, 835 S.W.2d 872 (1992).
[Vol. 20
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CHAPTER 2: FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT
FORM B-1
ELEMENTS OF CLAIM
The plaintiff alleges and has the burden of proving that the defendant
fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff [state alleged fact concealed]. In
order to prove fraudulent concealment on the part of the defendant, the
plaintiff must prove each of the following elements by a preponderance of
the evidence:
First, [either (1) the plaintiff and defendant were in a confidential
relationship; or (2) the defendant had superior knowledge and knew the
plaintiff was mistaken about a material fact and had no access to the informa-
tion known by the defendant; or (3) the defendant has made a representation
of material fact and must disclose more information to prevent the representa-
tion from being misleading to the plaintiff.]
Second, that the defendant failed to disclose a material fact to the
plaintiff;
Third, that the plaintiff could not have learned the omitted fact by
reasonable inquiry or diligent attention and observation;
Fourth, that the defendant failed to disclose the material fact with the
intention that the plaintiff be misled;" and
Fifth, that the failure of the defendant to disclose [state the alleged fact
not disclosed] proximately caused the plaintiff to suffer damages.
COMMENT
This instruction is derived from Camp v. First Fed. Savings & Loan;
45
Ward v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., N.A.;6 Copelin v. Corter;47 and Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. First National Bank.48 Compare this
proposed instruction to California, Oklahoma, and Tennessee jury
instructiols.
49
While the issue of whether a confidential relationship exists (and,
therefore, a duty to disclose) is sometimes characterized as a matter of law, the
44. This element supplies the scienter requirement for a fraud claim. See Wilson v. Misko,
508 N.W.2d 238 (Neb. 1993).
45. 12 Ark. App. 150, 671 S.W.2d 213 (1984).
46. 284 Ark. 355, 681 S.W.2d 365 (1984).
47. 291 Ark. 218, 724 S.W.2d 146 (1987).
48. 774 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1985).
49. See CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, Nos. 12.35, 12.37 (2d ed. 1994);
OKLAHOMA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, Nos. 18.2, 18.5 (2d ed.); TENNESSEE
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, Nos. 8.45, 8.47 (2d ed. 1988).
1997]
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Arkansas Court of Appeals in Camp, noted that, in light of language from
Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co.,° the circumstances in Camp
were sufficient to submit to the jury the question of whether there was a "duty
to speak."'" Therefore, the drafters included the determination of whether a
confidential relationship existed as one of the factual elements for the jury.5 2
However, this issue needs further clarification by Arkansas courts.
The drafters found the first element of fraudulent concealment to be the
most difficult to define. A duty to speak arises by virtue of either a confidential
relationship or the peculiar situation of the parties. This first element sets forth
those scenarios. Different courts have stated the three subparts of this element
in different forms in describing when a duty of disclosure arises.53 The drafters
believe the court must first determine if a fact question is presented as to any
of the three subparts of this element. If so, the court should submit one or more
of these subparts as a part of the instruction. If the court finds that there is
insufficient evidence to create a fact question on any of the subparts of the first
element, then there is no duty of disclosure and the tort of fraudulent conceal-
ment should not be submitted to the jury.
The third element of this claim also presents an open question. Based
upon the language of Brookside Village Mobile Homes v. Meyers,54 the drafters
believe the duty to investigate in cases alleging fraud by omission might be
considered the counterpart to justifiable reliance in cases alleging affirmative
misrepresentation.55 However, compare the elements of this claim as stated in
other states which suggest justifiable reliance is the standard. 6 The drafters
note that the elements of this claim in Nebraska also include "that the plaintiff
50. 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983). See also 37 AM. JUR. 2D, Fraud and Deceit
§ 146 (1968 & Supp. 1997).
51. Camp, 12 Ark. App. 150, 155, 671 S.W.2d 213, 216 (1984).
52. Cf. Lambert v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 682 So. 2d 61 (Ala. 1996).
53. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 774 F.2d 909
(8th Cir. 1985) (applying Arkansas law and stating the superior knowledge scenario); Exeter
Bancorporation, Inc. v. Kemper Sec. Group, Inc., 58 F.3d 1306, 1314 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying
Minnesota law and stating all three scenarios); Camp v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 12 Ark. App.
150, 671 S.W.2d 213 (1984) (stating the confidential relation scenario); Barsam v. Pure Tech
Int'l, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying New York law and stating the
confidential relationship and superior knowledge scenarios); Swersky v. Dreyer & Traub, 643
N.Y.S.2d 33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (applying New York law and stating the superior
knowledge scenario); and Banco Urquijo, S.A. v. Signet Bank/Maryland, 861 F. Supp. 1220
(M.D. Pa. 1994) (applying Pennsylvania law and stating the confidential relation scenario).
54. 301 Ark. 139, 142, 782 S.W.2d 365, 367 (1990).
55. See also Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128
(1983).




was reasonably so misled" which is also akin to the concept of justifiable
reliance."
The fourth element supplies the scienter requirement for a fraud claim.5'
CHAPTER 2: FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT
FORM B-2
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP
You are instructed that a confidential relationship existed between the
plaintiff and defendant if you find the following:
First, that the plaintiff put his trust in the defendant to act on the
plaintiff's behalf;
Second, that the defendant knew, or by his conduct acknowledged,
that the plaintiff was placing his trust in the defendant to act on the
plaintiff's behalf; and
Third, that the defendant was in a position to have and to exert
influence over the plaintiff and purported to act or advise with the
plaintiff's interest in mind.
A confidential relationship cannot be created unilaterally and must
be known to both parties. Mere subjective trust on the part of one person
and a cordial friendship do not create a fiduciary relationship.
COMMENT
This instruction is derived from Horton v. Koner,59 Camp v. First Federal
Savings & Loan;60 Capital Bank v. MVB, Inc. ;61 Salem v. Central Trust Co.,
N.A.;62 and Hallmark v. Port/Cooper-T. Smith Stevedoring Co.63  This
instruction is appropriate for use with Form B-I and Form C-1.
57. See Wilson v. Misko, 508 N.W.2d 238, 250 (Neb. 1993).
58. See id.
59. 12 Ark. App. 38, 671 S.W.2d 235 (1984).
60. 12 Ark. App. 150, 671 S.W.2d 213 (1984).
61. 644 So. 2d 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
62. 657 N.E.2d 827 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
63. 907 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. App. 1995). Compare CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CML,
Nos. 12.36, 12.37 (7th ed. 1986); TENNESSEE PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, Nos. 8.46,
8.47 (2d ed. 1988).
1997]
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See Form A- 10.
CHAPTER 3: CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
PREFACE TO CHAPTER 3
Constructive fraud is ill-defined in Arkansas and is therefore a difficult
subject matter for jury instruction.' It could be argued that constructive fraud,
as defined by Arkansas courts, is an equitable theory more suited to equitable
relief such as restitution, reformation or rescission.6S
Also unanswered is whether a claim of constructive fraud will support an
award of punitive damages.'6 Other state courts are divided on this question
and practicing attorneys need guidance on the issue from Arkansas courts.
64. Cf Morrison v. Back Yard Burgers, Inc., 91 F.3d 1184, 1188 (8th Cir. 1996). In
Morrison, the court stated that although a plea of constructive fraud relieves plaintiffs of the
burden of proving fraudulent intent, "[p]laintiffs must still prove the other elements of common
law fraud, including a false representation of a material fact and justifiable reliance upon the
representation." Id.
65. The Arkansas Supreme Court, in Miskimins v. City Nat7 Bank, defined constructive
fraud as the "breach of a legal or equitable duty which the law declares to be fraudulent because
of its tendency to deceive others, regardless of the moral guilt, purpose or intent of the fraud
feasor." Miskimins v. City Nat'l Bank, 248 Ark. 1194, 1204, 456 S.W.2d 673, 679 (1970)
(citations omitted). The Arkansas Supreme Court commented in South County, Inc. v. First
Western Loan Co., that constructive fraud has been recognized by the court in cases involving
rescission of deeds and other instruments and breaches of fiduciary duties. South County, Inc.
v. First W. Loan Co., 315 Ark. 722, 871 S.W.2d 325 (1994). However, Arkansas courts have
not so limited the claim.
66. See HoWARD W. BIJLL, ARKANSAS LAW OF DAMAGES § 33-8 (3d ed. 1996).
PROPOSED FRAUD INSTRUCTIONS
CHAPTER 3: CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
FORM C-1
ELEMENTS OF CLAIM
In order to prove his claim for constructive fraud, the plaintiff must
prove each of the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
First, that plaintiff and defendant were in a confidential relationship;
Second, that defendant breached the confidential relationship by
making a false representation of material fact, either knowing that the
representation was false or, not knowing, asserting the representation to
be true;
Third, that plaintiff justifiably relied upon the representation; and
Fourth, that, as a result of plaintiffs reliance, plaintiff suffered
damages.
COMMENT
This instruction has been pieced together from statements of law made by
courts in the following cases: Morrison v. Back Yard Burgers, Inc.;67
Miskimins v. City National Bank;6 Bridges v. United Savings Association;69
South County, Inc. v. First Western Loan Co.;7O and Union National Bank v.
Farmers Bank.7' The drafters believe the instruction accurately states current
Arkansas law on this tort.





67. 91 F.3d I 184 (8th Cir. 1996).
68. 248 Ark. 1194,456 S.W.2d 673 (1970).
69. 246 Ark. 221,438 S.W.2d 303 (1969).
70. 315 Ark. 722, 871 S.W.2d 325 (1994).
71. 786 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1986).
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CHAPTER 4: FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
PREFACE TO CHAPTER 4
The instructions in this chapter are designed to assist in implementing the
statutory causes of action created by the General Assembly in the Arkansas
Fraudulent Transfer Act (the Act).72
Because of the historic division of courts of law and of equity in
Arkansas, few actions for fraudulent transfer have been tried before juries. The
chancery courts, as a matter of common law, have historically avoided and set
aside fraudulent transfers and imposed equitable liens for the benefit of
creditors who lacked an adequate remedy at law.73 Prior to the adoption of the
Act, the Arkansas statutes also recognized the equitable remedy of avoidance
against those transactions that were fraudulent as to creditors.74
The Act, passed by the General Assembly in 1987, is comprehensive in
its scope, but the remedies provided to creditors generally remain equitable in
nature: avoidance of transactions, injunctions, receivers, and equitable liens. 75
The Act also provides a remedy at law-the recovery of a money judg-
ment-against the transferor and his transferees for the value of an asset
wrongfully transferred.76 Although the Act provides causes of action for the
72. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-59-201 to -213 (Michie 1996).
73. See Horstmann v. LaFargue, 140 Ark. 558, 564-66, 215 S.W. 729, 730-31 (1919),
overruled on other grounds by Spitzer v. Bamhill, 237 Ark. 525, 374 S.W.2d 811 (1964).
74. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-1302 (1979 & Supp. 1985).
75. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-207 (Michie 1996).
76. See id. § 4-59-208.
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fraudulent transfer of property and the fraudulent incurring of obligations, 77 the
Act only provides a remedy in the form of a money judgment for the fraudulent
transfers of property. 8 These proposed model instructions therefore address
only the elements of causes and defenses for the transfer of property, as those
are the causes and defenses for which a right to jury trial would be recognized
in the Arkansas courts by virtue of the remedy of a money judgment.
For those cases under the Act to be tried to juries, the drafters believe that
practicing attorneys need guidance in the form of model jury instructions. The
drafters propose jury instructions for the factual issues most likely to arise
under the Act. By not including in these model instructions a reference to, or
an instruction on, all potential factual issues under the Act, the drafters do not
intend to imply that there are no other factual issues that should be submitted
to the jury in a particular case.
Finally, the Act does not address the standard of proof required to
establish claims and defenses under the Act. In addition, the annotations to the
Act suggest there may be disagreement as to the standard of proof. The
drafters believe the proper standard is the preponderance of the evidence when
the plaintiff seeks damages. 79 Accordingly, the drafters suggest that AMI 20280
be submitted in conjunction with these instructions.
CHAPTER 4: FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
FORM D-1
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER - BEFORE OR AFTER
CLAIM AROSE - ACTUAL INTENT TO DEFRAUD
Plaintiff contends that defendant transferred [the property] with the
actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor and has the burden of
proving each of the following three essential propositions:
First, that plaintiff is a creditor of defendant;
Second, that defendant made the transfer with the actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor; and
Third, that the plaintiff has sustained damages.
77. See id. §§ 4-59-204(a)(I), -204(a)(2), -205(a).
78. See id. § 4-59-208(b), (c).
79. Compare the annotations to ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-204 (Michie 1996) and Grendell
v. Kiehl, 291 Ark. 228, 723 S.W.2d 830 (1987).




The Act provides a cause of action to creditors of the defendant(s) for
transfers of property or the creation of obligations by the defendant(s) with the
actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor.8' The transfer of property
or the creation of the obligation may occur before the plaintiffs claim arose if
the act occurred with the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud the plaintiff
or another creditor.
The Act further recognizes that actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud
is usually proven with circumstantial rather than direct evidence. Instead of
defining actual intent, the Act provides a nonexclusive list of factors that may
be considered by the fact-finder in determining whether actual intent has been
proved. 2 The drafters believe an instruction restating those factors would be
appropriate with this instruction.
83
The Act defines creditor as a person who has a right to payment from the
defendant, whether the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated,
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable,
secured, or unsecured.' The Act defines transfer equally broadly as every
mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of
disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes
payment of money, release, lease, and creation of lien or other encumbrance.8"
In the event the status of the plaintiff as a creditor or the existence of a transfer
is challenged, the drafters believe that the terms may be defined for the jury by
incorporation in an instruction of the definition in the Act.86
CHAPTER 4: FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
FORM D-2
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER - ACTUAL INTENT TO DEFRAUD -
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF TRANSFEREE
A transfer is not fraudulent against a person who took in good faith
and for a reasonably equivalent value [or against a subsequent transferee].
81. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-204(a)(i) (Michie 1996).
82. See id. § 4-59-204(b).
83. For an example of the form of an instruction that includes factors for the jury to
consider, see ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, No. 2215A (3d ed. & Supp. 1995).
84. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-201(3),(4).
85. See id. § 4-59-201(12).
86. For an example of the form of a definitional instruction, see AMI 306.
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A person takes in good faith when the circumstances would not place
a reasonable person on inquiry of a debtor's fraudulent purpose and a
diligent inquiry would not have discovered the fraudulent purpose.
[The transferee defendant] has the burden of proving this defense.
COMMENT
The defense of good faith and the giving of reasonably equivalent value
may only be submitted in response to claims of conduct with the actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.87 This form is therefore limited to the
submission of defenses to the cause of action in Form D-1.
Good faith is not defined in the Act. However, the drafters have included
a definition of good faith which they believe is consistent with the Act.88
Value and reasonably equivalent value are defined by example in section
203 of the Act.89 The drafters believe that an instruction on the meaning of
value or reasonably equivalent value may not be necessary in every case.
CHAPTER 4: FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
FORM D-3
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER - BEFORE OR AFTER
CLAIM AROSE - No REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE
Plaintiff contends that defendant transferred [the property] without
receipt of reasonably equivalent value and has the burden of proving each
of the following three essential propositions:
First, that plaintiff is a creditor of defendant;
Second, defendant made the transfer without receiving a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange, and defendant either
(1) was engaged in or was about to engage in a business or a
transaction for which [his, her, its] assets were unreasonably small in
relation to the business or transaction, or
(2) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have
believed that [he, she, it] would incur, debts beyond [his, her, its]
ability to pay as they became due; and
Third, that the plaintiff has sustained damages.
87. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-208(a) (Michie 1996).
88. See In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co., 84 F.3d 1330, 1336-1338 (10th Cir. 1996); In re
Sherman, 67 F.3d 1348, 1355 (8th Cir. 1995); In re Agricultural Research & Tech. Group, Inc.,
916 F.2d 528, 536 (9th Cir. 1990).




The cause of action provided in section 204(a)(2) of the Act does not
require actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.9° The essence of the
cause of action is the exchange without reasonably equivalent value. The
plaintiffs claim also need not arise before the making of the transfer or the
incurring of the obligation.
Value and reasonably equivalent value are defined by example in section
203 of the Act.9' The drafters believe that an instruction on the meaning of
value or reasonably equivalent value may not be necessary in every case.
CHAPTER 4: FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
FORM D-4
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER - AFTER CLAIM AROSE -
INSOLVENCY AND No REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE
Plaintiff contends that defendant transferred [the property] without
receiving equivalent value and has the burden of proving each of the
following four essential propositions:
First, that plaintiff is a creditor of defendant;
Second, defendant made the transfer without receiving a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer;
Third, defendant was insolvent at the time of the making of the
transfer or became insolvent as a result of the transfer; and
Fourth, that the plaintiff has sustained damages.
COMMENT
The cause of action provided in section 205(a) of the Act does not require
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.92 The essence of the cause
of action is the making of a transfer without the receipt of reasonably
equivalent value in exchange.
The cause of action provided in section 205(a) requires that the creditor's
claim arise before the making of the transfer.93 However, the proposed
instruction includes no such element for the jury's consideration. The time of
the making of a transfer or the incurring of an obligation is governed by section
90. See id. § 4-59-204(a)(2).
91. See id. § 4-59-203. Creditor is defined in section 201(3) and (4) of the Act. Transfer
is defined in section 201(12) of the Act.




206 of the Act.94 Because the rules in section 206 require the application of
principles of property and commercial law to the facts, the drafters believe that
the timing of the accrual of the claim presents a question of law for the courts.95
The court must therefore first conclude that the creditor's claim arose before the
transfer or obligation in order to properly submit this claim to the jury.
Value and reasonably equivalent value are defined by example in
section 203 of the Act.9 The drafters believe that an instruction on the
meaning of value or reasonably equivalent value may not be necessary in every
case.
Insolvency is defined in section 202 of the Act. 97 Section 202 creates a
presumption of insolvency if the defendant/debtor is not paying debts as they
become due. The definition of insolvency from section 202 will vary with the
,facts of the particular case.
Creditor is defined in section 201 of the Act.9
CHAPTER 4: FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
FORM D-5
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER - AFTER CLAIM AROSE -
TRANSFER TO INSIDER
Plaintiff contends that defendant transferred [the property] to an
insider while defendant was insolvent, and has the burden of proving each
of the following five essential propositions:
First, that plaintiff is a creditor of defendant;
Second, that defendant made the transfer to an insider for an
antecedent debt;
Third, defendant was insolvent at the time of the transfer;
Fourth, the insider had reasonable cause to believe that defendant
was insolvent; and
Fifth, that the plaintiff has sustained damages.
94. See id. § 4-59-206.
95. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-206 (Michie 1996).
96. See id. § 4-59-203.
97. See id. § 4-59-202.




The cause of action provided in section 205(b) of the Act does not require
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.99 The cause of action
pertains to transfers of property by a defendant to an insider only, not to
obligations incurred by a defendant. The essence of the cause of action is the
transfer by the defendant, while insolvent, to an insider for an antecedent debt.
Section 205(b) of the Act also requires that the creditor's claim arise
before the making of the transfer or the incurring of the obligation."
However, the proposed instruction includes no such element for the jury's
consideration. The time of the making of a transfer or the waiving of an
obligation is governed by section 206.101 Because section 206 requires the
application of principles of property and commercial law to the facts, the
timing of the accrual of the claim presents a question of law. The court must
decide whether the creditor's claim arose before the transfer or obligation in
order to properly submit this claim to the jury.
Insider is defined in section 201(7) of the Act. 0 2 Creditor is defined in
sections 201(3) and (4) of the Act. 03 Transfer is defined in section 201(12) of
the Act.'4
Insolvency is defined in section 202 of the Act. That section creates a
presumption of insolvency if the defendant/debtor is not paying debts as they
become due.0 5 The definition of insolvency from section 202 will vary with
the facts of the particular case.
99. See id. § 4-59-205(b).
100. See id.
101. See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-59-206 (Michie 1996).
102. See id. § 4-59-201(7).
103. See id. § 4-59-201(3), (4).
104. See id. § 4-59-201(12).
105. See id. § 4-59-202.
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CHAPTER 4: FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
FORM D-6
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER -TRANSFER TO INSIDER -
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
A transfer to an insider is not fraudulent:
[To the extent the insider gave new value to or for the benefit of the
debtor after the transfer unless the new value was secured by a valid lien]
or
[If the transfer was made in the ordinary course of business or
financial affairs of the debtor and the insider] or
[If the transfer was made in a good faith effort to rehabilitate the
debtor and the transfer secured present value given for that purpose as
well as the antecedent debt of the debtor].
The defendant has the burden of proving [this] [these] defense(s).
COMMENT
This form may be used to submit defenses to the cause of action submitted
in Form D-5.'06 If the first bracketed defense is submitted, then the fact finder
should also be allowed to determine the extent of new value given and the
extent to which the transfer secured an antecedent debt.'0 7
CHAPTER 4: FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
FORM D-7
MEASURE OF DAMAGES
If you find for the plaintiff on the question of liability you must then
fix the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate him
for the value of the asset transferred at the time of the transfer or the
amount necessary to satisfy the plaintiff's claim, whichever is less.
Whether either of these elements has been proved is for you to
determine.
106. See id.§ 4-59-208(f).




This instruction follows the format of AMI 2221.'08 As noted in the
preface to this chapter, although the Act provides causes of action for the
fraudulent transfer of property and the incurring of obligations, it is only the
fraudulent transfers of property for which the Act provides a remedy in the
form of a money judgment.'0°
If the jury finds damages based on the value of the asset at the time of the
transfer, the award may still be subject to equitable adjustment by the court. " 0
108. ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, No. 2221 (3d. ed).
109. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-208(b), (c).
110. See id. § 4-59-208(c).
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